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Abstract The quest for practical cryptographic primitives that are robust
against quantum computers is of vital importance for the field of cryptography.
Among the abundance of different cryptographic primitives one may consider,
one-way functions stand out as fundamental building blocks of more complex
cryptographic protocols, and they play a central role in modern asymmetric
cryptography. We propose a mathematical one-way function, which relies on
coarse-grained boson sampling. The evaluation and the inversion of the func-
tion are discussed in the context of classical and quantum computers. The
present results suggest that the scope and power of boson sampling may go
beyond the proof of quantum supremacy, and pave the way towards crypto-
graphic applications.
1 Introduction
One-way functions play a central role in modern cryptography, because they
serve as building blocks for many cryptographic protocols [1,2]. A one-way
function (OWF) F is “easy” to perform, but “hard” on the average to invert,
in terms of efficiency and speed [1,2]. That is, there is a large gap between
the amount of computational work required for the evaluation of y = F(x)
for a given input x, and the amount of work required to find x such that
y = F(x), for a given y. Widely used cryptosystems rely on OWFs for which
the non-existence of inversion algorithms has never been rigorously proved,
and quantum computers threatens their security [3,4,5].
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The design of OWFs that are robust against quantum computers is cur-
rently at the focus of extensive interdisciplinary research [4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,
12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. In this context, quantum OWFs (QOWFs) have
been proposed as alternatives to conventional mathematical OWFs [6,7,8,9,
10,11,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,20]. QOWFs exploit quantum properties of physi-
cal systems, and provide solutions to security problems that are not addressed
by quantum key distribution e.g., verification of identities, data integrity, etc.
Many of these solutions require the same specialized infrastructure as quan-
tum key distribution, and they suffer from the same practical limitations as
the latter [21]. An alternative approach to quantum-safe (also referred to as
post-quantum) cryptography relies on the quest for mathematical OWFs that
are hard to invert by classical and quantum means [4,5]. Such OWFs can serve
as building blocks of cryptographic protocols that are computationally secure
against both classical and quantum adversaries, and they are fully compatible
with existing communication protocols and networks.
In this work, our aim is to suggest a way of exploiting the problem of bo-
son sampling (BS) for the design of a mathematical OWF. The problem of
BS pertains to sampling from a boson probability distribution, with the vari-
ous probabilities associated with the modulus squared permanents of N ×N
submatrices of a uniformly (Haar) random M ×M unitary matrix Uˆ (with
M > N) [22,23,24]. It has been shown that exact (and presumably even ap-
proximate) BS is hard for classical computers, unless there are severe highly
implausible implications for computational complexity theory [22]. By con-
trast, BS is native to linear quantum optics, which makes it very attractive to
photonic experiments [23,24]. Typically, a photonic BS device (BSD) involves
a linear photonic circuit that implements Uˆ between M input and M output
ports [24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31]. Injecting N identical photons at the input
and using coincidence photodetection at the output, one essentially samples
directly from the underlying photon (boson) distribution. A BSD is expected to
outperform conventional computers in large-scale BS, thereby offering a solid
proof of “quantum supremacy” [22,24]. Unfortunately, recent studies place the
threshold for quantum supremacy at N ≃ 50 bosons andM ∼ N2 ports, which
is well beyond the current and near-term experimental capabilities [32].
To the best of our knowledge, so far the BS has not been discussed in
connection with applications that go quantum supremacy and simulations. The
present work is the first attempt in the direction of cryptographic applications.
Our analysis, together with existing results [32,33], suggests that evaluation of
the proposed OWF for a given input can be performed on a classical computer
for N . 40, while due to the nature of the underlying problem, construction
of inversion algorithms is conjectured to be practically impossible. Moreover,
the resources required for its brute-force inversion scale exponentially with N ,
for both classical and quantum adversaries.
The paper is organized as follows. After the preliminaries of Sec. 2, in Sec.
3 we propose the bootstrap technique as a means for assigning measures of
accuracy to any statistic estimated on coarse-grained BS data. The one-way
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function is proposed in Sec. 4, and its properties are discussed in detail. A
summary with concluding remarks is given in Sec. 5.
2 Preliminaries
We consider BS in the dilute limit (i.e., M ∼ N2), where the problem can be
analysed accurately in the framework of
(
M
N
)
collision-free N -boson configura-
tions. Let
S = {s(0), s(1), . . .} (1)
be the set of all of these configurations, which have been ordered according
to some publicly known rule. The κth configuration s(κ) ∈ S, is a tuple of N
distinct positive integers
s(κ) := (s
(κ)
1 , . . . , s
(κ)
N ), (2)
where s
(κ)
j ∈ [0,M) ≡ ZM refers to the port that is occupied by the jth boson.
When {M,N} are publicly known, the set S is also publicly known, while its
size scales exponentially with N as follows
|S| ≥ (MN−1)N , (3)
for M ≥ N2. A configuration s(κ) is uniquely identified by its position in the
set S (i.e., its label κ), which is a positive integer that takes values in Z|S| :=
{0, 1, . . . , |S|−1}. Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set
of possible configurations S, and the set of positive integers Z|S|. Moreover, it
takes
n = N × (⌊log2(M)⌋+ 1)
bits of information to describe the ports that are occupied by the N bosons
in configuration s(κ), where ⌊log2(M)⌋ + 1 is the bit-length of the label of a
port.
The set of boson configurations is partitioned into d & M disjoint subsets
{B0,B1, . . . ,Bd−1}, which have approximately the same size i.e., |Bj | ≈ |S|/d.
Throughout this work we assume that the number of bins d scales polynomially
with {M,N} (i.e., d ∼ poly(M,N)), and it is sufficiently large so that boson-
interference effects survive the binning, and they are reflected in the coarse-
grained probability distribution. These conditions are necessary in order for
the binning to be useful in the framework of the present work, as well as in
the design of efficient verification schemes for BSDs [34,35,36]. In the dilute
limit of BS, related studies show that boson-interference effects can survive the
binning for d & M [34,35,36,37]. For the sake of concreteness, in the following
we consider the coarse graining discussed in Ref. [37].
Given an input configuration ψ ∈ S, the probability for obtaining configu-
ration ϕ ∈ S at the output, is given by
P˜ (ϕ|ψ;U) = |Per(Uˆψ,ϕ)|
2,
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where Per(Uˆψ,ϕ) is the permanent of an N ×N submatrix of Uˆ , which is de-
termined by the input and output boson configurations [22,23,24]. The OWF
we propose below relies on the quest for the most probable bin (MPB) of the
coarse-grained distribution
P(ψ; Uˆ) := {P (β|ψ; Uˆ) : β ∈ Zd}, (4)
where P (β|ψ; Uˆ) is the conditional probability for the bin with label β to
occur, given the input configuration ψ and the unitary Uˆ . Let µ ∈ Zd denote
the label of the MPB Bµ, with the corresponding maximum probability given
by
Pmax := P (µ|ψ; Uˆ) =
∑
ϕ∈Bµ
P˜ (ϕ|ψ; Uˆ).
For a given unitary, both of µ and Pmax depend strongly on the input config-
uration ψ [37], and cannot be predicted without knowledge of ψ. When ψ is
known, one can sample directly from the coarse-grained distribution, and the
various probabilities can be approximated by the frequency of occurrence of
the bins in the sample, thereby obtaining an estimate of Pmax, say pmax, and
making an inference on the label of the MPB.
Irrespective of whether the sampling is performed by classical or quantum
means, in practice one can aim only at attaining a 100(1 − γ)% confidence
interval (CI) to Pmax, for some uncertainty γ ≪ 1, and width (error) ε. Unam-
biguous estimation of the MPB by means of sampling is possible when the size
of the sample is sufficiently large to ensure a rather precise estimation of Pmax.
Let us assume that we sample N times from the coarse-grained boson distri-
bution, with the same input configuration ψ, and we record the coarse-grained
data
a1, a2, . . . , aN , (5)
where aj ∈ Zd is the label of the jth recorded bin. The probability P (β|ψ; Uˆ) is
then approximated by the frequency of occurrence of the label β in the original
sample (5), which is given by pβ := nβ/N , where nβ is the number of occur-
rences. The bin with the largest frequency of occurrence pmax := maxβ{pβ},
is the empirical MPB, i.e., our guess for the actual MPB.
Clearly, pmax is a random variable, i.e., it varies from sample to sample,
and its distribution depends on the boson distribution we sample from. To
obtain a CI on Pmax, one needs to know how much the distribution of pmax
varies around Pmax. For perfect boson sampling it has been shown that one
needs a sample size of at least
N (0) =
12d
ε2
ln(2γ−1), (6)
to ensure
Pr[pmax − ε/2 < Pmax < pmax + ε/2] > 1− γ, (7)
for ε < 1/d≪ 1 and γ ≪ 1 [37]. This is the 100(1− γ)% CI for Pmax, and the
sample sizeN (0) quantifies the cost for the establishment of the CI. The growth
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of the sample size is basically determined by the relative error and the number
of bins, whereas the dependence on γ is only logarithmic. Equation (6) shows
that attaining high accuracy is far more costly than getting high confidence. As
mentioned above, throughout this work we assume that d scales polynomially
with {M,N}, and thus N (0) also scales polynomially with {M,N}.
Equation (6) relies on the Chernoff bound, and it is applicable to any
combination of parameters {M,N, d}. At various stages of its derivation we
have adopted the worst-case scenario [37], which suggests that in practice the
same CI could be attained for smaller sample sizes i.e., smaller costs. Of course,
the main quantity of interest in the present work is the label of the MPB of
the coarse-grained distribution, and Eq. (6) is of relevance if one tries to find
the MPB, through the estimation of the maximum probability. However, this
is not the only available approach. Algorithm 1, which is discussed in Sec.
3B, relies on the bootstrap technique and allows for a direct estimation of the
MPB, without the need for an explicit estimation of the maximum probability
Pmax. For the sake of completeness, and in order to gain further insight into
the performance of algorithm 1, in Sec. 3.1 we also discuss the performance of
the bootstrap technique with respect to the estimation of Pmax, although this
estimation is not explicitly involved in algorithm 1.
3 Estimation of the most-probable bin through bootstrap analysis
of boson sampling data
Bootstrap is a standard statistical technique [38,39], which allows one to assign
measures of accuracy (e.g., confidence intervals) to a statistic estimated on
some random sample data. Such a statistic may be the sample mean, the
sample variance, etc, and the main advantage of the bootstrap technique is
that it does not require any prior knowledge on the underlying distribution.
In the present work we employ the bootstrap technique to assign confidence
interval to the maximum probability of the coarse-grained boson distribution,
and to make an educated guess for the MPB, based solely on the data that have
been obtained from coarse-grained boson sampling (CGBS). The procedure is
as follows.
Using a standard computer, we re-sample from the original sample data (5)
with substitution, to produce an empirical bootstrap sample of size N . The
same procedure is repeated M times resulting in M independent bootstrap
samples:
bootstrap sample 1 : b1,1, b1,2, . . . , b1,N , (8a)
bootstrap sample 2 : b2,1, b2,2, . . . , b2,N , (8b)
...
bootstrap sample M : bM,1, bM,2, . . . , bM,N . (8c)
According to the bootstrap principle, the variation of the difference ∆ :=
pmax − Pmax is well approximated by the variation of ∆∗ := p∗max − pmax,
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where p∗max is evaluated from an empirical bootstrap sample. That is, p
∗
max is
the maximum recorded frequency of occurrence of a bin in a single bootstrap
sample, and let µ∗ denote the label of the corresponding bin. The power of
bootstrap relies on the fact that ∆∗ is obtained by re-sampling directly from
the original data (5) with substitution, and the procedure does not involve the
calculation of any permanents. This is a straightforward computational task,
and by means of a standard computer, one can obtain as many bootstrap
samples as necessary, to estimate ∆∗ to high precision.
For each one of the M bootstrap samples we compute ∆∗ := p∗max −
pmax, and the results are sorted in ascending order (from smallest to biggest).
Moreover, we keep track of the most-frequent bin in each bootstrap sample,
thereby obtaining a sequence of most-frequent bins
M = {µ∗1, µ
∗
2, . . . , µ
∗
M}, (9)
where µ∗j ∈ Zd is the most-frequent bin in the jth bootstrap sample. By
definition, the 100(1− γ)% confidence interval for Pmax is
Pr[pmax −∆
∗
(1−γ/2) ≤ Pmax ≤ pmax −∆
∗
(γ/2)] = 1− γ,
(10)
where ∆∗(ζ) denotes the (100× ζ)th percentile of the ordered list of bootstrap
values for ∆∗. The width of the CI is given by ε = ∆∗(1−γ/2) − ∆
∗
(γ/2), and
quantifies the error in the estimation of Pmax. An educated guess about the
label of the actual MPB, may rely on the sequence of most-frequent bins (9).
Let Ωβ denote the frequency of appearance of the bin β in the sequence (9),
and let Ωmax := maxβ{Ωβ}. The bin that appears more often in the sequence
(9), is most likely to be the actual MPB. That is, the label of the empirical
MPB is µ˜ such that Ωµ˜ = Ωmax, and may or may not coincide with the label
of the actual MPB µ. This point is clarified below.
3.1 Performance of the bootsrtap technique
The performance of the bootstrap technique in the framework of boson sam-
pling has been analysed by means of extensive simulations. Our simulations
have been restricted to values of M and N , for which the problem under con-
sideration is within reach of our computational capabilities [37]. For a fixed
randomly chosen unitary, we were able to construct exactly (up to numerical
uncertainty) the entire boson distribution, for any input configuration and any
number of bins. Having the boson distribution, we were able to simulate CGBS
for any number of bins, and to study the sample sizes required for attaining
high-confidence intervals to the maximum probability of the coarse-grained
distribution, and for identifying the MPB.
As an example, consider the case of M = 26, N = 3 for fixed unitary, two
different input configurations ψ, and three different numbers of bins (see Fig.
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Fig. 1 (Color online) Coarse-grained boson sampling for M = 26, N = 3. The histograms
show the exact coarse-grained distribution we sample from. The (red) circles with the error
bars show the 99.9% CIs for the probabilities of the various bins, while the horizontal dashed
blue and dot-dashed green lines define the 99.9% CIs for the maximum probability. The CIs
have been obtained by means of the bootstrap technique for M = 104. The plots on the
same row pertain to the same input configuration and the same number of bins, but different
sample sizes (i.e., N = 104 on the left and N = 105 on the right). The arrows point at the
actual MPB in each case. Number of bins: d = 51 (a,b); d = 75 (c,d); d = 151 (e,f). Index
of input configuration (following the ordering of Ref. [37]): 16 (a,b); 753 (c,d); 16 (e,f).
1). In the first choice of ψ and d [see histograms in Figs. 1(a-b)], the coarse-
grained distribution exhibits a clear dominant peak (at the 17th bin), which
differs from the second largest peak (at the 48th bin) by δ1 ≃ 1.3 × 10−3.
By obtaining a sample of size N = 104 and M = 104 bootstrap samples,
one can establish a 99.9% CI for the maximum of the distribution, which
has a width ∼ 10−2 [see Fig. 1(a)]. Increasing the sample size to N = 105,
the width of the CI decreases to about 4.5 × 10−3, and the overlap between
the CI for the maximum probability and the CI for the second largest peak,
decreases considerably [see Fig. 1(b)]. According to Eq. (6), without the use
of the bootstrap method, one has to sample at least 2 × 108 times from the
coarse-grained boson distribution, in order to attain a 99.9% CI of the same
width. In Figs. 1(c-d) we have chosen another input configuration and a larger
number of bins. The probabilities for the four dominant peaks (at the 2nd,
the 22nd, the 25th and the 36th bins) lie within an interval δ2 ≃ 6 × 10
−4.
Applying the bootstrap method for N = 104 andM = 104, we obtain a 99.9%
CI for the maximum with width ∼ 0.008, which has a large overlap with the
CIs of various bins [see Fig. 1(c)]. For N = 105, the width of the CI for the
maximum decreases to about 0.002 [see Fig. 1(d)]. According to the Chernoff
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bound, without the bootstrap technique a 99.9% CI of such width cannot be
attained for sample sizes below 109. An analogous behavior is depicted in Figs.
1(e,f), where the main two dominant peaks of the coarse-grained distribution
differ only by δ3 ≈ 2× 10−5.
The sample sizes considered in Fig. 1 are not sufficiently large to ensure
CIs for the maximum probability, which are narrower than the difference of
the probabilities of the two dominant peaks in the depicted coarse-grained
distributions. However, from the discussion above it is clear that using the
bootstrap technique one can reduce considerably the sample sizes required
for attaining a CI of a certain width, relative to the required sample sizes
without the use of the technique (as predicted by the Chernoff bound). It is
also worth emphasizing that Fig. 1 is for a single realization, and a CI is a
random interval, whose center and width vary from realization to realization.
In any case, as depicted in Fig. 2, the width for the CI of the maximum
decreases with increasing sample size as αN−β , for positive α, β < 1. The
precise values of (α, β) depend on the number of bins, as well as on the details
of the coarse-grained distribution.
Analogous variations are present in the frequency of occurrence Ωβ of the
bin β in set M, which is the main quantity of interest. Such variations are
shown in Fig. 3 for the same parameters as in Fig. 1, and various sample
sizes that go beyond the sample sizes in Fig. 1. The diagrams in the first
row correspond to the distribution (bar chart) depicted in Figs. 1(a,b), which
exhibits one clear dominant peak (at the 17th bin) that differs by δ1 from the
second largest peak (at the 48th bin). As depicted in the graphs of the top row
of Fig. 3, the overlap between the boxes and the whiskers vanish very quickly
as one increases the sample size, while keeping M constant. Consider now
the distributions depicted in Figs. 1(c,d), where the probability of the MPB
(the 25th bin), differs from the probabilities of the 2nd, the 25th and the 36th
bins by at most δ2. Once more we find that the bootstrap method identifies
correctly all of the dominant peaks in the distribution, and the overlap between
the various boxes and whiskers decreases with increasing sample size. In this
case, however, the convergence is a bit slower than in the graphs on the top of
the same figure, due to the fact that δ2 < δ1. The situation is fundamentally
different in the diagrams at the bottom row of Fig. 3, which correspond to the
probability distribution shown in Figs. 1(e,f). In this case the two dominant
peaks differ by δ3 ≈ 2× 10−5, and we find a large overlap of the boxes as well
as of the whiskers for sample sizes up to N ≃ 2× 107. Hence, in this range of
sample sizes the two peaks are practically indistinguishable, and one can only
make a guess for the actual MPB, with the probability of a wrong guess being
particularly high (∼ 0.5).
The above findings show clearly that the bootstrap technique is capable of
identifying the dominant bins in the coarse-grained distribution. Moreover, in
the limit of “large” sample sizes, all of the bootstrap samples are expected to
return the same most-frequent bin, which coincides with the actual MPB of the
underlying distribution. The values of the sample size N for which this limit is
attained depends on the coarse-grained distribution P(ψ; Uˆ) we sample from,
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Fig. 2 (Color online) The width of the CI for the maximum probability of the coarse-
grained distributions of Fig. 1, is plotted for different sample sizes. The symbols show the
recorded maximum, minimum and central values of the width, in 500 independent realiza-
tions. The dashed lines are fits to the numerical data of the form αN−β . The estimated
values of (α, β) for the two outermost curves are also shown. The parameters used in the
three figures are the same as in the rows of Fig. 1.
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Fig. 3 (Color online) Box and whisker diagrams for the data on the fraction of bootstraps
that result in the same most-frequent bin. The diagrams on the same row pertain to the
same input configuration, the same number of bins, and different values of the same sample
size N (shown on the top). Each diagram has been obtained by means of 500 independent
realizations. For each realization the data were analysed by means of M = 104 bootstraps,
and we recorded the fraction of bootstraps that resulted in the same most frequent bin.
For each box the lower and upper bounds refer to the first and the third quartiles, and the
horizontal (white line) the median. The vertical whiskers (error bars) show the extrema of
the recorded fractions. For the bins that are not included in the diagrams the fraction of
bootstrap samples is zero. The label of the actual MPB is shown in bold face and underlined.
Other parameters as in the rows of Fig. 2.
and in particular on the distance δ between the two largest probabilities. The
bootstrap technique is capable of distinguishing between the MPB and the bin
with the second largest probability when the width of the CI for the maximum
probability satisfies ε . δ. These findings dictate a strategy for the inference
of the MPB from the data of a single realization, which is summarized in
algorithm 1, and is discussed in the next subsection.
3.2 Algorithm for estimation of the most-probable bin in a coarse-grained
boson distribution
The main idea behind algorithm 1 is to increase gradually the sample size
until the majority of the M bootstrap samples [at least 100(1− ξ)% of them
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ALGORITHM 1 Estimation of the MPB of an unknown coarse-grained boson distribu-
tion P(ψ; Uˆ), for fixed M,N and d ∼ poly(M,N), by means of bootstrap analysis.
Input: integers M≫ 1, δN >M, l = 1, and L > 1. A real positive number ξ ≪ 1
and STATUS = INIT.
1. Sample δN times from P(ψ; Uˆ).
2. Analyze together the sample data from all of the l rounds by means of the
bootstrap technique, to obtain the sequence of most-frequent bins (9).
(a) If Ωmax < 1− ξ and l < L, increase l by 1 and return to step 1.
(b) If Ωmax < 1− ξ and l = L, set STATUS = ABORT.
(c) If Ωmax ≥ 1− ξ and l ≤ L, set STATUS = END, and accept µ˜ : Ωµ˜ = Ωmax
as the empirical MPB.
Output: STATUS, and a guess for the label of the MPB µ˜ ∈ Zd, if STATUS = END.
for ξ ≪ 1], return the same most-frequent bin. In each round the sample size
is increased by δN , and the algorithm aborts if the predetermined majority
has not been attained, and the total sample size has reached an upper bound
N
(I)
max := LδN , which is determined by our computational capabilities. Exe-
cution of the algorithm 1, may result in three different scenarios. (a) STATUS
= END and µ˜ = µ: The algorithm has been successful in identifying the actual
MPB. (b) STATUS = END and µ˜ 6= µ: The algorithm has failed to identify the
actual MPB. (c) STATUS = ABORT: The algorithm has returned an inconclusive
result. The performance of the algorithm can be quantified in terms of the cor-
responding probabilities i.e., the probability of success ps, the probability of
failure pf , and the probability of an inconclusive result p?. These probabilities
were estimated numerically, in the framework of independent realizations (see
appendix B), and our main findings for the cases considered in Figs. 2 and 3,
are depicted in Fig. 4. In all of the cases, for small sample sizes we have p? = 1,
pf = 0 and ps = 0. In general, the probability of inconclusive result decreases
with increasing sample size, whereas the probability of success increases by
the same amount, and the probability of failure remains practically negligible.
How fast ps (p?) increases (decreases) depends on how close are the dominant
peaks of the coarse-grained distribution. By contrast, the probability of fail-
ure in Figs. 4(a-c) is pf . 1.2 × 10−2, which is of the order of ξ used in our
simulations. This was to be expected, because the choice of ξ in algorithm 1
determines the confidence in choosing the empirical MPB. The smaller ξ is,
the higher the confidence becomes. In any case, one can combine the algorithm
1 with standard error-correction techniques [40], in order to ensure negligible
values for pf . For instance, repeating the algorithm r times (for odd r ≥ 3),
and deciding on the empirical MPB using majority logic decoding, one can
reduce the probability of failure by ⌈r⌉ ≥ 2 orders of magnitude.
Although not present in algorithm 1, the width of the underlying CI for
the maximum probability at the end of the L rounds determines the accuracy
in the evaluation of the maximum probability, and it can help us to under-
stand deeper the performance of the algorithm. Based on the analysis of Sec.
3.1, algorithm 1 is expected to abort when the coarse-grained distribution
P(ψ; Uˆ) exhibits two or more nearly degenerate dominant peaks i.e., when
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Fig. 4 (Color online) The probabilities of success, failure, and inconclusive result for al-
gorithm 1, are plotted as functions of the sample size N
(I)
max, for ξ = 10
−2. The parameters
used for each row are the same as for the rows of Figs. 2 and 3.
δ . ε, where δ is the difference of the two largest probabilities in P(ψ; Uˆ),
and ε is the width of the CI that has been attained by the algorithm. For a
given d, the existence of such degenerate dominant peaks (to be referred to
hereafter as ε-close dominant peaks) depends on the coarse-grained distribu-
tion we sample from i.e., on the input configuration ψ and on the unitary
Uˆ . In an effort to estimate how frequent is the presence of ε-close dominant
peaks in coarse-grained boson distributions, we analysed all of the distribu-
tions for various combinations of {d,M,N}, and 100 Haar random unitaries.
For each combination of {d,M,N, Uˆ} and a given value of ε, we estimated the
fraction of input configurations for which the corresponding coarse-grained
distributions exhibit two or more ε-close dominant peaks. As expected, for
each combination of {d,M,N}, the fraction was found to vary from unitary to
unitary, and in Fig. 5 we plot the maximum recorded fraction qmax for differ-
ent values of ε. Clearly, qmax decreases with ε, and it is bounded from above
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Fig. 5 (Color online) The fraction of input configurations for which the coarse-grained
distribution P(ψ; Uˆ) exhibits two or more ε-close dominant peaks, is plotted as function
of ε, for two different values of d, and various values of (M,N). The maximum has been
obtained over 100 random unitaries, and the dashed curve shows an upper bound given by
2dε0.8.
by 2dε0.8. Analogous behavior has been found for all of the combinations of
parameters we studied, which suggests that this is a universal bound. It is also
worth emphasizing that for the particular choices of (M,N) shown in Fig. 5,
the size of the input space |S| ranges from about 800 to about 15000. Yet, this
broad range is not reflected in the corresponding numerical estimates for qmax
at a fixed ε, which remains practically constant while varying (M,N). In other
words, we find a very weak dependence of qmax on (M,N), and thus on |S|,
which suggests that the maximum probability for algorithm 1 to abort is not
expected to increase with increasing |S|.
The last issue that must be clarified before closing this section pertains to
the maximum number of rounds L in algorithm 1, which essentially determines
the maximum allowed sample size N
(I)
max = LδN before the algorithm aborts.
Clearly, L should depend only on known quantities, and not on the details of
the coarse-grained distribution, which are not a priori known. Based on the
aforementioned findings, it is desirable for N
(I)
max to be sufficiently large so that
2dε0.8 . 0.1. (11)
In this way one ensures that, given a randomly chosen input configuration,
the algorithm will abort with probability . 0.1. In algorithm 1 the estimation
of the MPB is not achieved through the estimation of the maximum prob-
ability, and thus the CI for Pmax, is not involved in the process. However,
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Fig. 6 (Color online) The proposed OWF takes as input an integer x, chosen at random
from a uniform distribution over Z|S|. Sequential coarse-grained BS (CGBS) is performed
for N boson configurations s(κ1), s(κ2), . . ., which are generated from x via a publicly known
classical algorithm g. The sequence of most frequent bins µ˜1, µ˜2, . . . is processed though a
publicly known algorithm G to yield the output y ∈ Z|S|.
the results of the previous subsection show that the sample sizes required for
assigning a high-confidence interval to the maximum probability by means of
the bootstrap technique, do not exceed the sample size predicted by the Cher-
noff bound. The latter may serve as a benchmark for the number of rounds
L in algorithm 1. In particular, inequality (11) together with Eq. (6) for low
uncertainty γ = 5× 10−4, dictates
N (I)max & 1.8× 10
5d7/2. (12)
Note that in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b), the probability of success in guessing the MPB
by means of algorithm 1 has converged to 1, for an overall sample size, which
is considerably smaller than the one predicted by the r.h.s of inequality (12).
Analogous behavior has been found for all of the combinations of parameters
that we have investigated in our simulations (see appendix C for additional
results). In view of the polynomial scaling of d with {M,N}, these findings
show that algorithm 1 is expected to succeed or to abort for an overall sample
size that scales polynomially with {M,N}. Of course, an alternative approach
is to let L (and thus N
(I)
max) be determined by the computational capabilities,
as mentioned above.
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ALGORITHM 2 One-way function F , based on the quest for the MPB of a coarse-grained
boson distributions P(•; Uˆ), for fixed M,N and d ∼ poly(M,N).
Input: integer x chosen at random from uniform distribution over Z|S|.
1. For j ∈ [1, N ]:
(a) Algorithm g. Estimate κj = [κj−1 + int(|S| × | sin(j − 1)|)] mod(|S|),
where κ0 := x.
(b) Apply algorithm 1 to obtain a guess for the MPB of the coarse-grained boson
distribution P(κj ; Uˆ), through the most-frequent bin µ˜j .
If the algorithm aborts, repeat the step for (κj + 1) mod(|S|).
2. Post-processing (G) of µ˜ = {µ˜1, µ˜2, . . . , µ˜N}.
(a) Write the labels of the free ports from 0 through M − 1, in ascending order.
(b) Counting from the low end, strike out the m−th label not yet struck out,
where m := µ˜j mod[M
(j)
f
], and M
(j)
f
is the number of free ports that are
available to the jth boson. Let the chosen label be ϕj .
(c) Repeat step (b) for each element of µ˜ to obtain ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕN ).
Output: integer y ∈ Z|S|, which refers to the position of the configuration ϕ in S.
4 One-way Function
We assume a publicly known fixed unitary Uˆ , and a publicly known algorithm 1
with parameters {M,N, d}. A schematic representation of the proposed OWF
y = F(x) is given in Fig. 6, and a detailed description is given in algorithm
2. The input x and the output y of the OWF are integers in the set Z|S|. The
output y basically determines the position of boson configuration ϕ in S, which
is generated by N iterations of the CGBS, with seeds that are determined by
the input x. As discussed in Sec. 2, there is a unique y in Z|S| such that
ϕ = s(y), with s(y) in S.
Algorithm 1 is invoked in step 1(b) of algorithm 2. As discussed above,
algorithm 1 will fail to return a conclusive answer about the label of the MPB
of the distribution P(κj ; Uˆ) [for the sake of simplicity from now on we write
P(κj ; Uˆ) instead of P(s(κj); Uˆ)], when there are two or more ε-close maxima
in the distribution. Given that x is chosen at random, and the details of the
distribution are not a priori known, one cannot predict in advance whether
algorithm 1 will abort or not. Hence, when algorithm 1 aborts, step 1(b) of
algorithm 2 is repeated for a new coarse-grained distribution pertaining to the
next input configuration. Our simulations suggest that it is highly unlikely for
the coarse-gained distributions of successive input configurations to exhibit
nearly-degenerate maxima. As long as L is sufficiently large so that 2dε0.8 ≪ 1,
repetition of step 1(b) is expected to be a rare event, rather than a regular
necessity.
The classical sub-algorithms g and G entering our OWF are considered to
be publicly known. The general structure of the OWF remains unchanged irre-
spective of the sub-algorithms one may choose, but an imprudent choice may
compromise the security of our OWF. According to our studies, the proposed
OWF performs rather well for the particular choice of sub-algorithms, given
in algorithm 2. A sub-algorithm similar to g is used in the context of MD5
to generate additive constants in each step [1]. The sub-algorithm G used in
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algorithm 2 relies on Fisher-Yates shuffling method, and a numerical example
of it is given in appendix A.
4.1 Properties
The properties of the proposed OWF have been investigated numerically for
various combinations of {M,N, d}. For a given combination, the above algo-
rithm was applied to evaluate the output (image) y = F(x) for each one of the
possible inputs (pre-images) x in Z|S|, thereby obtaining the number of occur-
rences for each output y ∈ Z|S|. The typical behavior is depicted in Fig. 7(a),
where one may notice the existence of outputs with one or more occurrences,
as well as the existence of elements y ∈ Z|S| with zero occurrences (i.e., there
is no x ∈ Z|S| such that F(x) = y). These findings were present for all of the
combinations of parameters we considered throughout our simulations, and
imply that the set of all the outputs with one or more occurrences, say Y, is
a subset of Z|S|. The largest number of occurrences νmax and the size of Y are
of particular importance for the security of the OWF, and for a fixed unitary,
they depend on the combination of the parameters {M,N, d}. As depicted in
Fig. 7(b), |Y| scales linearly with |S|, and the slope is determined by d. Hence,
in view of Eq. (3), |Y| scales exponentially with N . Moreover, νmax depends
weakly on d, and it is well approximated by a linear function of M and N [see
Figs. 7(c,d)]. In other words, the largest number of occurrences scales poly-
nomially with (M,N) whereas the size of the domain |S| scales exponentially.
Given these findings, we can discuss the resources required for the evaluation
and the inversion of the proposed OWF.
4.2 Evaluation of the one-way function
Let Tc denote the classical run-time for the evaluation of F(x) for a given x
by means of a classical computer. The run-time scales as
Tc ∼ N
(tot)
ev Rc/(ωncpu), (13)
where N
(tot)
ev denotes the total sample size required for the evaluation, Rc
denotes the number of floating-point operations per sample, ncpu is the number
of CPU cores involved in the calculation, while ω denotes the floating-point
operations per second (flops) and depends on the type of the CPU.
The proposed OWF involves N rounds of CGBS and for each round algo-
rithm 1 is called, which according to the aforementioned discussion, is expected
to converge for an overall sample size that scales as ∼ d7/2. The fastest known
classical algorithm for boson sampling requires O(N2N) operations to produce
a single sample [32], and thus we obtain
Tc ∼ d
7/2N22N(ωncpu)
−1. (14)
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Fig. 7 (Color online) (a) Number of occurrences (black disks) of the various output con-
figurations, when F is evaluated for all possible inputs (preimages) x ∈ Z|S|, in the case of
M = 15, N = 3, d = 51. Note the existence of outputs with zero, one or more occurrences.
(b) The number of images with non-zero occurrences |Y|, for various combinations of {M,N}
(i.e., for various sizes of the input space |S|). The symbols (disks,triangles) refer to mean
values obtained by averaging over 100 Haar random unitaries, and the error bars denote the
corresponding standard deviations. The dashed lines are linear fits of the form |Y| = α|S| to
the numerical data with slopes α shown next to the lines. (c) As in (b) for the maximum
number of occurrences νmax, in the case of 31 bins. The linear fit to the numerical data is
also shown (dashed line). (d) As in (c) for 51 bins.
Given that d scales polynomially with (M,N), the evaluation of the function
for a given x ∈ Z|S| is only polynomially harder than the evaluation of a per-
manent of an N × N complex matrix by means of Ryser’s algorithm, whose
run-time is O(N2N) [32,37]. In view of recent numerical studies on the compu-
tation of permanents [32,37,33], evaluation of the proposed OWF for N . 40
is expected to be a feasible task for classical computers.
4.3 Inversion of the one-way function
Consider an adversary who is given y = F(x) and his task is to find an input
x˜ ∈ S, such that y = F(x˜). The adversary is not asked to find the specific input
used by the legitimate user in the evaluation of y. Any input that satisfies
y = F(x˜) will do. If F were bijective, x would be the only pre-image of y
under F . As discussed above, however, this is not the case for the OWF under
consideration.
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We are not aware of any algorithm (quantum or classical) that can directly
invert the proposed OWF i.e., to evaluate x˜ = F−1(y). There are at least
two main difficulties to the construction of such an algorithm. (i) For a fixed
unitary, the coarse-grained distribution is not a priori known, and it depends
on the randomly chosen input x. (ii) The output of the function also depends
strongly on the input, in the sense that there is only a very small (relative |S|)
number of inputs that satisfy y = F(x˜) [see Figs. 7(c,d) and related discussion].
A standard approach to the inversion of a OWF, is the exhaustive (or
brute-force) search, where the adversary tries successively every possible input
until he finds the right one. Given that the proposed OWF is not bijective,
the question arises is how many inputs an adversary has to randomly select,
before there is greater than (1− η) chance for one of the chosen configurations
to satisfy y = F(x˜), for some 0 < η < 1. The answer to this question quantifies
the work effort that an adversary has to do, if he conducts an exhaustive search.
Let ν denote the number of pre-images that satisfy y = F(x˜), with 1 <
ν ≪ |S|, and let t⋆ := |S| − ν. Given that νmax scales linearly with {M,N}
and ν ≤ νmax, by virtue of inequality (3) we conclude that the growth of
t⋆ with {M,N} is mainly determined by the exponential growth of |S|. The
probability for the adversary to fail to find a pre-image in t trials is given by
Pf(t) =
{∏t
j=1
[
1− ν|S|−(j−1)
]
if 1 ≤ t ≤ t⋆,
0 if t > t⋆.
The lower branch of this function refers to the unlikely, yet possible, sce-
nario for the adversary not to find a preimage of y in t⋆ trials. In this case, the
adversary will have performed an exponentially large number of unsuccessful
trials, and the next guess will be certainly among the possible preimages of y.
We focus now on the case of 1 ≤ t ≤ t⋆.
The difference in the brackets decreases with increasing j, and thus
Pf(t) ≥
[
1−
ν
|S| − t+ 1
]t
≥ exp
(
−
tν
|S| − t+ 1− ν
)
. (15)
For the second inequality we have used Jensen’s inequality ln(z) ≥ (z − 1)/z,
for all z > 0. So, the number of trials required in order for the probability of
failure to be equal to or smaller than some positive number η < 1, satisfies
t ≥
(|S|+ 1− ν)| ln(η)|
ν + | ln(η)|
. (16)
For fixed unitary and fixed parameters {M,N, d}, the number of preimages ν
depend on the given output y. Noting, however, that the l.h.s. of the inequality
is a decreasing function of ν, a lower bound on t is given by
tmin :=
(|S|+ 1− νmax)| ln(η)|
νmax + | ln(η)|
. (17)
where νmax is the largest number of preimages for the given combination of
{M,N, d}. As shown in Fig. 8, tmin scales linearly with |S| and the slope is
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Fig. 8 (Color online) The minimum number of trials tmin given by Eq. (17), for various
combinations {M,N} (i.e., different sizes of the input space |S|) and three different values
of η. The symbols (disks, squares, triangles) denote the mean values of tmin over 100 Haar
random unitaries, and the error bars denote the corresponding standard deviations. The
dashed lines are linear fits of the form νmax = α|S| to the numerical data, with the slopes α
shown next to the lines. Other parameters as in Fig. 7.
determined by the number of bins d, and η. For example, in the case of 51
bins, the adversary needs at least 0.2|S| and 0.3|S| trials for the probability
of failure to drop below η = 10−1 and η = 10−2, respectively. In view of Eq.
(3), these findings suggest that the number of trials and thus the overall work
effort for an exhaustive search increases exponentially with N , irrespective of
whether the adversary uses a classical or a quantum computer.
As discussed above, a classical legitimate user is able to evaluate F(x) for
a chosen x at run-time Tc ∼ poly(N)× 2N . By contrast, a classical adversary
who conducts the exhaustive search using the same classical algorithm will
have to perform tmin ∼ NN more operations than the legitimate user. For
the sake of concreteness, consider the case of N = 21 and M ≥ N2. The
classical run-time of an exhaustive search scales as T˜c ∼ (2N)N (ωncpu)−1,
and for N = 21 we have T˜c ∼ 1034(ωncpu)−1 sec. For a supercomputer with
ncpu = 10
4 and ω = 1021 flops, T˜c ∼ 30 years. Such computing power is
not currently available, and according to Moore’s law it is not expected to
be available before 2030. For the time being exhaustive search by means of
a BSD is practically impossible for N & 5, because of the very low sampling
rates [32]. It has been conjectured that by means of near-term experimental
improvements, 20-boson sampling may be possible at a rate of ∼ 130h−1 [31],
which cannot compete with the sampling rates of classical computers [32].
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Given that the proposed OWF relies on a sampling problem and on the
evaluation of permanents, Shor’s algorithm and its variants cannot be used
for its inversion. Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the construction
of an inversion algorithm is conjectured to be practically impossible. A brute-
force quantum search using Grover’s algorithm [3], is the only currently known
attack which can be implemented on a universal fault-tolerant quantum com-
puter. Analogous attacks are applicable to any symmetric or asymmetric cryp-
tosystem, but they are not considered to be a serious threat because the speed-
up offered by Grover’s algorithm is not as dramatic as Shor’s speed-up. More
precisely, for the OWF under consideration Grover’s algorithm is expected to
find a preimage with high probability using approximately
√
|S|/νmax evalu-
ations [41], as opposed to tmin ∼ |S|/νmax evaluations required by a classical
exhaustive search algorithm (see Eq. 17). Given the exponential growth of |S|
with N and the polynomial dependence of νmax on N , the quantum search al-
gorithm will also need an exponentially large number of operations (∼ NN/2).
Hence, the security of the proposed OWF against Grover’s algorithm can be
increased by increasing the number of bosons N used in the OWF. It is worth
noting that each one of the
√
|S|/νmax evaluations must wait for the previous
evaluation to finish. Taking into account this limitation various authors be-
lieve that it is very likely for Grover’s improvement to be eliminated in practice
by the high cost of qubit operations [5], thereby making Grover’s algorithm
useless.
4.4 Collision search
We have seen that the proposed OWF exhibits collisions i.e., two or more
inputs (preimages) x may have the same image y under F . This means that we
are essentially dealing with a one-way hash function [1]. The resistance of the
proposed OWF to inversion is sufficient for certain cryptographic applications,
but there are also applications where one has to ensure its resistance against
collision search. For this reason, it is worth discussing here the performance
of the so-called “birthday attack” against the proposed OWF. This is also a
powerful brute-force attack, which is applicable to any hash function, and in
its simplest form proceeds as follows.
1. The adversary chooses an input x at random, he calculates y = F(x), and
stores the pair (x, y) in a database.
2. The adversary chooses randomly a new input x′, and checks whether the
new output y′ = F(x′) already exists in the database.
3. If it does the procedure stops, because a collision has been found. If it
does not, then the new pair (x′, y′) is added to the database and step 2 is
repeated.
The probability of finding at least one collision P
(bs)
suc , increases with the
number of elements in the database θ. In particular, in the framework of a
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Fig. 9 (Color online) Performance of the birthday attack on the OWF. (a) The probability
of finding a collision as a function of the number of random choices θ, for M = 20, N = 3,
d = 31. For each θ, the symbol shows the average over 100 Haar random unitaries, and the
error bar denotes the maximum and minimum recorded values. The solid curve is a fit of
Eq. (18) to the numerical data, with |W| = σ|S| and the value of σ shown in the legend. (b)
Same as (a) forM = 20, N = 4, d = 51. (c,d) The number of random choices θ∗ required for
P
(bs)
suc = 1/2, is plotted as function of the size of input space |S|, for d = 31 (c) and d = 51
(d). Symbols and error bars as in (a,b). The dashed curve is a fit of α
√
|S| to the numerical
data, with the proportionality constant α shown in the legends.
generic birthday attack one readily obtains for θ ≪ |W| [42]
P (bs)suc = 1− exp
(
−
θ(θ − 1)
2|W|
)
, (18)
where |W| is the total number of images (outputs) under consideration. Given
that this estimate pertains to a generic model, deviations may be expected
when the attack is applied on a particular hash function.
For the OWF discussed in the present work, we have seen that there are
outputs, with 0, 1, or more preimages, which is not taken into account in the
derivation of Eq. (18). Hence, as a first correction, one may expect that Eq.
(18) will be valid when the birthday attack is launched against our OWF, but
with some effective size of the output space |W| = σ|S|, where the constant σ
depends on {M,N, d, Uˆ}.
In order to confirm this, and to obtain an estimate of the constant σ, we
have simulated numerically the birthday attack on the OWF under consid-
eration, for various combinations of parameters, and our main findings are
summarized in Fig. 9. Figures 9(a,b), show clearly that there are small varia-
tions with the choice of the unitary, but the increase of P
(bs)
suc with θ follows the
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law of Eq. (18). An estimate for the effective size of the output space can be
obtained by fitting Eq. (18) to the averaged data. Moreover, in Figs. 9(c,d) we
plot the number of random choices θ∗ required for P
(bs)
suc = 1/2, as a function
of the size of the input space |S|. Our results suggest that θ∗ ≃ α
√
|S|, where
the proportionality constant α is determined fully by the desired value of P
(bs)
suc
and the number of bins. Thus, by virtue of Eq. (3) and the polynomial scaling
of d with N , we have that θ∗ scales exponentially with N (i.e., θ∗ ∼ NN/2).
Hence, the birthday attack imposes a lower bound on the number of bosons,
so that the function under consideration is secure against collision search with
certain computing power.
A few remarks are in order before closing this section. (i) Quantum com-
puters are not expected to be more efficient than classical computers in finding
collisions. (ii) The resistance of an elgorithm against collision search also im-
plies second-preimage resistance [42]. (ii) Collision resistance is not important
for all of the possible applications of a one-way hash function [43].
5 Concluding remarks
We have discussed a way of exploiting the problem of BS in the design of a
OWF. For practical reasons, our simulations have been restricted to combina-
tions of {M,N} for which, exact (up to numerical error) construction of all
the possible boson distributions through the evaluation of all of the related
permanents, was within reach of our computational capabilities. This tedious
task was necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, it allowed us to investigate
the convergence of our algorithms with respect to the sample sizes required
for an accurate estimation of the MPB of the coarse-grained distribution. Our
findings suggest that convergence can be attained for sample sizes that scale
polynomially with {M,N}, and they are comparable to or smaller than the
sample sizes that have been obtained analytically using the Chernoff bound.
Secondly, we were able to analyze the properties of the proposed OWF, in-
cluding the presence of collisions, and the size of the image space.
In view of recent results on classical boson sampling algorithms [32], our
analysis suggests that evaluation of the proposed OWF for a given input can
be performed on a classical computer for N . 40. Yet, exhaustive (brute-
force) search, which is the only currently available approach to the inversion
of the function, requires resources that scale with the number of bosons as
∼ NN , irrespective of the computing power of the adversary. Hence, brute-
force inversion of the proposed OWF can be thwarted by choosing sufficiently
large values of N (typically N & 21). The resources required for successful
collision search by means of a birthday attack also scale exponentially with N ,
but as ∼ NN/2.
For the evaluation of the OWF on a classical computer one may employ
the algorithm in [32], which relies on Metropolised independence sampling.
This algorithm does not need any particular software, and the authors in Ref.
[32] demonstrate samples of size 104 for N ≃ 20 bosons on a standard laptop,
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with the production of a sample taking less than 30 minutes. Taking into ac-
count the numerical techniques of Ref. [33], the algorithm of Ref. [32] allows
for sampling with large number of bosons (up to 50), when implemented on
a supercomputer. The implementation of the bootstrap technique is straight-
forward, and does not require any special software or hardware.
The structure of the OWF is rather general and can accept different choices
for the binning, the sub-algorithms g and G, as well as for the algorithm that
is used for the estimation of the MPB. An interesting question is whether
there is an optimal way of choosing the bins in the coarse graining of boson-
sampling data for given {M,N}, and whether the present algorithms can be
extended to other clustering techniques [36]. It is also worth investigating
whether the OWF can be modified so that to eliminate the possibility of
inconclusive results, while keeping the probability of failure negligible. In this
case, the evaluation of the OWF will become even more efficient, because it
will require smaller sample sizes. An extension of the proposed OWF to the
case of BS beyond the dilute limit should be possible, provided one allows for
multiple bosons to occupy the same port. It is not clear, however, whether and
how such an extension will affect the properties of the OWF discussed above,
and an additional thorough investigation is required in order to shed light on
these issues.
The present results suggest that the usefulness of boson sampling may not
be limited to the proof of quantum supremacy, and pave the way towards
cryptographic applications, which offer computational security against both
classical and quantum adversaries. The design of specific protocols goes beyond
the scope of the present work, and is a subject of future research.
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A Appendix: Example of Fisher-Yates shuffling method
To illustrate the application of Fisher-Yates shuffling method in our context, let us consider
the case of M = 10 modes and N = 4 bosons. Let the sequence of most-frequent bins that
has been obtained at the end of step 1 in algorithm 2 be µ˜ = {3, 7, 6, 9}. Initially none of
the ports is occupied (round 0). As shown in table 1, in the jth round the jth element of
the set µ˜ dictates the port that will be occupied (shown in bold face), and it is deleted from
the list of free ports.
B Appendix: Evaluation of probabilities
Algorithm 1 outputs an educated guess µ˜ for the label of the MPB. When the flag STATUS =
END, there are two different scenarios for the guess i.e., either it is equal to the actual
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Table 1 An example of the algorithm G used in the proposed OWF, for the case ofM = 10
ports, N = 4 bosons.
Round M
(j)
f
µ˜j m Free ports Occupied ports
0 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
1 10 3 3 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 3
2 9 7 7 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 3, 8
3 8 6 6 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 3, 8, 7
4 7 9 2 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 3, 2, 8, 6
label µ, or it is different. In the former case the algorithm has succeeded, whereas in the
latter it has failed. A third possibility is for the algorithm not to converge for the given
maximum number of rounds L. In this case the algorithm outputs the flag STATUS = ABORT,
which refers to an inconclusive outcome. The probabilities of success, of failure and of
inconclusive result have been estimated numerically. To this end, for a given set of parameters
{M,N, d,M, ξ, L}, a given unitary Uˆ and a given input configuration ψ, we performed
500 independent realizations of the algorithm 1. The probabilities were estimated by the
following quotients:
ps =
Number of realizations in which STATUS = END and µ˜ = µ
Total number of realizations
, (19)
pf =
Number of realizations in which STATUS = END and µ˜ 6= µ
Total number of realizations
, (20)
p? =
Number of realizations in which STATUS = ABORT
Total number of realizations
. (21)
C Appendix: Performance of algorithm 1 with respect to the
numbers of bins
As discussed in Sec. 3, the performance of algorithm 1 depends on the difference δ of the
values of the two dominant peaks in the unknown coarse-grained distribution we sample
from. In general, for fixed {M,N, Uˆ}, the difference δ varies with the input configuration
ψ, as well as with the number of bins d. Such variations are shown in Figs. 10(a,c), for two
different input configurations. Moreover, as depicted Figs. 10(b,d), the sample size required
for algorithm 1 to identify the right MPB follows closely the variations of δ in Figs. 10(a,c),
albeit in a very different scale. More precisely, it is clear that the sample size tends to
increase (decrease) when δ decreases (increases). It is also worth noting that the sample
sizes depicted in Figs. 10(b,d) are orders of magnitude below the quantity on the r.h.s. of
Eq. (12), which confirms once more the analysis in Sec. 3.2.
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